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Highlights 
• Offshore infrastructure projects will play a key role in enabling the 
EU to meet its renewable energy goals. Therefore, effective economic 
incentives must be in place to ensure adequate investments.
• Since the liberalisation of the power sector, the use of ‘incentive regu-
lation’ has become a standard practice among European regulators. 
This TSO incentive regulation is done in a ‘portfolio’ fashion. 
• In the countries analysed, different risk/remuneration profiles are set 
according to the general regulatory regimes. These risk/remunera-
tion profiles have not changed significantly since the previous study 
conducted by Glachant et al. (2013). 1 
• Nevertheless, in recent years, regulators are also providing dedicated 
incentives for specific strategically important or necessary invest-
ments, including offshore projects.
• We observe that the trend of providing dedicated incentives appears 
to modify the risk/remuneration characteristics, leading to a more 
‘investment friendly’ environment for TSOs, at least for certain types 
of assets, such as offshore transmission infrastructures.
1. Glachant, J.-M., Saguan, M., Rious, V., Douguet, S., 2013. Incentives for invest-
ments: Comparing EU electricity TSO regulatory regimes. doi:10.2870/80768.
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1. Introduction
Since the liberalisation of the power sector, the use of 
‘incentive regulation’ has become a standard practice 
among European regulators. Furthermore, Article 13 
(1) of the TEN-E regulation for PCIs mandates the 
use of dedicated incentives for projects that may be 
deemed to have higher risks for their development, 
construction, operation or maintenance. In the past 
few years regulators have opted for a case-by-case 
regulation as a means to incentivise necessary or 
strategically important investments. Nevertheless, it 
has not substituted portfolio regulation. 
Offshore wind is expected to play a major role in 
enabling the EU to meet its greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reduction and renewable energy target in the near 
and long-term future. In this context, the develop-
ment of a robust offshore electricity grid infrastruc-
ture has the potential to deliver many benefits. Thus, 
such investments may be considered ‘necessary or 
strategically important’.
This research extends the work of Glachant (2013), 
and Meeus and Keyaerts (2014).2 We present the 
combined impact that the general regulatory regime 
and dedicated incentives may have on the risk and 
remuneration for TSOs3. Regulatory structures of 
Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Bel-
gium are assessed. These four countries were chosen 
because of their relevance to the development of off-
shore wind power.
2. General National Regulatory Regimes
In each analysed country, a general regulatory 
regime for transmission infrastructures sets the ‘risk 
and remuneration characteristics’ for the TSO. For 
the analysis of the general regulatory schemes, we 
2.  Meeus, L and Keyaerts, N (2014). The role of the EU and ACER to ensure an adequate regulatory framework for projects of 
common interest. Florence School of Regulation; 2014/05; Policy Briefs
3.  One can argue that not only TSOs invest in offshore transmission infrastructures. Although this is true, our analysis is fo-
cused on the TSO, considering that investments on a future meshed offshore grid will be more suitable for TSOs, or at least 
they are expected to carry the greatest volume of investments in the early stage of a meshed offshore grid.
use the analytical framework presented by Glachant 
(2013). In Section 2.1 we describe the assessment 
framework. This is followed by an update on changes 
to the national regulatory regimes that have occurred 
since the previous study by Glachant (2013) in Sec-
tion 2.2.
2.1 Assessment Framework
The framework presented by Glachant (2013) 
assesses the regulatory regime’s capability to: 1) Suf-
ficiently remunerate TSO investments and to ensure 
their financeability. 2) Reduce the risk borne by the 
TSO. 3) Incentivise reduction the TSO’s costs. 4) 
Transfer efficiency gains and redistribution to final 
users, using five economic properties of the regula-
tory regimes. These properties are namely; 1) The 
length of the regulatory period. 2) The scope of the 
revenue cap. 3) The tools to define allowances and 
efficiency targets. 4) The practical setting of the cap-
ital remuneration. 5) The adjustment mechanisms. 
The results were then transposed into a graphical 
taxonomy to illustrate the level of risk and remuner-
ation for each national regulatory regime. 
2.2 Update of General National Regulatory Regimes
A literature review indicated that there is not much 
change in the positions of the countries since the 
analysis conducted by Glachant (2013). The Neth-
erlands moved slightly up and left on the chart, as 
previously existing adjustment mechanisms were 
excluded for the new regulatory period. Also, a new 
decreasing WACC was established. Belgium too saw 
a decrease in remuneration, moving slightly to the 
left in the chart.
Figure 1 illustrates the position of TSOs in different 
countries. A high remuneration moves the flag to the 
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right graph, while a risky characteristic in the regula-
tion (e.g. efficiency targets over investments) moves 
the flag up. For the Netherlands and Belgium, the 
outlined frames illustrate the initial positions from 
the 2013 study.
 Figure 1: Assessment of the current national 
regulatory frameworks4
3. Dedicated Incentives
An alternative way of dealing with specific invest-
ments is by the implementation of dedicated incen-
tives. These incentives are in addition to the default 
national regulatory framework. To analyse dedicated 
incentives, we use the work done by Meeus and Key-
aerts (2014). The remuneration increase is mainly 
calibrated in two ways, either by a fixed premium for 
eligible project or via a case-by-case assessment and 
individual premium. Risk mitigation may be done 
by exemption from the default CAPEX efficiency 
benchmarking; increasing the regulatory period, 
and advance timing of cost recognition. Usually, an 
ex-ante assessment of eligibility is also implemented 
4.  Note that the position of each country is illustrative, and although the axis of the graphic represents scales, no inference on 
the actual amount can be made. It serves rather as a comparative illustration of a qualitative analysis.
5.  Ofgem, 2013. Strategic Wider Works (SWW) - Factsheet
6.  Ofgem, 2014. OFTO Build : Providing additional flexibility through an extended framework Updated policy proposals
to control the cost efficiency of the investments that 
would eventually receive dedicated incentives. In this 
section, we discuss the dedicated incentive schemes 
in four countries.
3.1 Great Britain
Dedicated incentives in Great Britain are not in one 
package of measures. The main programme is called 
the Strategic Wider Works (SWW). However, other 
policies and decisions also serve the purpose of ded-
icated incentives. 
The SWW scheme allows the TSO to bring projects 
forward once are they mature enough for considera-
tion. Ofgem carries a project assessment to verify if 
the request is justified. If so, the project can be devel-
oped by the TSO, and outputs and allowed revenues 
are adjusted5. 
Another dedicated framework for specific assets is 
the Offshore Transmission Owner (OFTO) model. 
This framework deals specifically with offshore con-
nections. Since 2009, farm-to-shore connections 
are not built by the TSO, but by the developer that 
transfers the ownership to a competitively appointed 
OFTO after completion6. Now, Ofgem wants to pro-
mote the ‘OFTO build’ model, in which the con-
struction of the connection will also be a responsi-
bility of the OFTO.
Lastly, a separate regime may also be applied to 
interconnections. This was the case for the NEMO 
interconnector, a 1 GW subsea cable linking Bel-
gium and GB. For this infrastructure, a ‘cap and 
floor’ regime was adopted, meaning that the project 
developer may receive revenues from the congestion 
of the interconnection, limited to a floor, ensuring 
a minimal revenue for the developer, and a cap, to 
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avoid overpayment by users7. To calculate the rev-
enue cap and floor, Ofgem used a “building block”. 
First, an assessment of efficient costs for the project 
was carried, followed by a return on capital assess-
ment and an OPEX assessment.
3.2 Germany
Germany has dedicated incentives schemes for cross-
regional, cross-border and offshore investments8. 
Large national and cross-border grid-expansion 
investments that support the German Energiewende 
are eligible to receive dedicated incentives. 
In the case of offshore transmission lines, the TSO 
is mandated to proactively provide connections. 
Nevertheless, additional incentives are provided 
for risk mitigation. The offshore connections are 
approved by the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) 
under the so-called investment measures. Under 
this category, offshore connections are qualified 
as permanently non-influenceable costs to which 
7.  Ofgem, 2014. Decision on the cap and floor regime for the GB-Belgium interconnector project Nemo.
8.  Op. cit. fn. 2
9.  TenneT, 2017. Fixed-to-Reset Rate NC7.1 Perpetual Capital Securities Prospectus.
10.  op. cit. fn. 9
11.  Elia, 2017. Making the energy transition happen - Annual Report 2016.
no efficiency targets apply. Also, costs are directly 
included in the revenue cap based on planned costs9.
3.3 The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, two special risk mitigation 
measures are applied. Offshore grid investments 
are remunerated while under construction and no 
benchmark/theta or frontier shift will apply in this 
first regulatory period. The maximum deprecia-
tion period for offshore grid assets is 20 years10. The 
WACC though is the same as for onshore invest-
ments. 
3.4 Belgium
Belgium offers dedicated incentives for ‘strategic 
investment projects’, that mainly consists of 
an additional remuneration over the project. 
Strategic investments are primarly aimed at 
improving EU integration and may be entitled 
to receive an additional mark-up. According to 
Elia,11 “this additional remuneration is calculated 
Table 1 summarises the dedicated incentives in the assessed countries. 
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as a percentage of the cumulative actual amount 
dispensed (investment amounts are capped per 
year and per project).” The additional incentive, 
however, is linked to the OLO rate (free-risk rate). 
The markup is applied at full rate if the OLO rate 
is equal to or below 0.5%. If the OLO is higher, the 
markup is reduced proportionally, capped at 2.16%. 
The application of the additional remuneration is 
also conditioned to the on-time commissioning of 
the investment, subject to penalties otherwise. 
3.5 Summary
The impact of these incentives on risk and remuner-
ation is illustrated in Figure 2. We categorise dedi-
cated incentives into two groups: increased remu-
neration and risk mitigation measures. In Germany 
and the Netherlands, the schemes are focused on 
reducing the risk for TSOs (downward arrow). Bel-
gium provides additional remuneration indicated by 
a rightward pointing arrow. In Great Britain addi-
tional remuneration along with the risk mitigation 
measures is provided, the combined effect indicated 
by a right downward-pointing arrow.
4. Conclusions & Policy Implications
Since the previous study by Glachant (2013), the 
default regulatory frameworks of the countries ana-
lysed have not changed significantly in terms of their 
risk and remuneration characteristics. However, it is 
observed that in the past few years regulators have 
started providing additional dedicated incentives 
for necessary or strategically important investments. 
The trend of providing dedicated incentives modify 
the risk and remuneration characteristics set by the 
general national frameworks to provide the TSO 
with a more “investment friendly” environment, 
at least for certain types of assets, such as offshore 
transmission infrastructures.
Figure 2: Impact of dedicated incentives on risk and 
remuneration of TSOs
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